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INTRODUCTION

HE INCREASED USE of arbitration as a means of settling
labor disputes has caused an increase in the problems concerning judicial review of the labor arbitration award. While 95 per
cent or more of the awards made annually probably never get into
court," a few instances of judicial review raise a question as to the function of the court reviewing an award on jurisdictional grounds. A limited area of review may be unavoidable and perhaps desirable in isolated instances. Arbitration is a creature of the parties; they may
choose their own judge, procedure, and criteria for decision. In view of
this and the agreement of the parties to be bound by the decision of the

impartial arbitrator, much judicial review is undesirable.
Judicial review of an award may arise in an action on the contract as
interpreted by the award or in a procedure to enforce the award. In
either case, the court may of necessity review the action of the arbitrator as an incident of the enforcement procedure.2 This indirect review
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law.
x Gregory and OrlikoffThe Enforcement of Labor Arbitration Agreements, 17 Univ. Chi. L.
Rev. 233, 235 (igso). See Kellor, Arbitration in Action 139 n. 2 (194t): "In the arbitrations
held under the Rules of Procedure of the American Arbitration Association, approximately
6 per cent of the commercial case awards have been filed with the courts for entry as judgments. In its industrial arbitration between management and employees, an even higher percentage of observance by both management and unions prevails. On the other hand, it is true
in states having laws that make legal enforcement of awards difficult, arbitration is little used,
indicating a lack of confidence in the remedy itself where there is no ultimate legal compulsion." In Updegraff and McCoy, Arbitration of Labor Disputes 125 (1946), it is observed
that labor arbitration awards are "practically never" converted to judgments. "[F]irst, because the parties are anxious to avoid the courts, and second, because labor disputes are
usually of such a nature that no benefit would accrue from the securing of a judgment."
Freiden and Ulman, Arbitration and the National War Labor Board, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 309, 316
n. 2$ (1945), set forth some statistics illustrating how seldom labor arbitration awards find their
way into courts.
2For a brief summary of the enforcement of awards at common law on a contract theory,
see 6 Williston, Contracts §§ 1919-1930 (rev. ed. 1937). A review of statutory procedure is
found in Ziskind, Labor Arbitration under State Statutes (U.S. Dept. of Labor, 1943), where
it is pointed out that "there are no less than 116 separate methods of labor arbitration authorized by State statutes." See Braun, Settlement of Industrial Disputes 227 et seq. (1944).
Federal arbitration systems are also discussed in Braun, op. cit. supra at 145. The participation of government on all levels in the settlement of industrial disputes is considered in Kaltenborn, Governmental Adjustment of Labor Disputes (1943).
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usually comes as a part of the decision as to whether a collateral attack
on the award will be allowed. As contrasted with this, direct review may
be had when the court directly inquires into the validity of the award.
Matters arising on direct review will be discussed here.
In theory, the basis for judicial review of an arbitrator's award is
very narrowly restricted. The New York court of appeals has stated it
in this manner: "The award of an arbitrator cannot be set aside for
mere errors of judgment, either as to the law or as to the facts. If he
keeps within his jurisdiction and is not guilty of fraud, corruption or
other misconduct affecting his award, it is unassailable, operates as a
final and conclusive judgment, and, however disappointing it may be
the parties must abide by it." 3
In the absence of misconduct on the part of the arbitrator, this would
seem to limit the court to a review on jurisdictional grounds.4 The rationale of review on jurisdictional grounds is that arbitration is based
upon the voluntary consent of the parties to be bound by the decision
of the impartial arbiter. The enforcibility of an award rests entirely
upon this consent as it is expressed in the collective agreement, and in
so far as it is effective, moral suasion. If the arbitrator by his award
goes beyond the matter submitted to the arbitration process in the
agreement, his award is unenforcible because the necessary element of
consent is lacking. This question of the scope of the submission agreement is the major, actual or alleged basis of judicial review, and most
cases fall within this category.
The submission agreement is usually found in the collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the union representing his
employees. Many such contracts have a provision to the effect that
"[a]ll such disputes, misunderstandings and grievances.., arising out
of or in any manner connected with this Agreement which the parties
are unable to adjust or settle among themselves (except such as are not
subject to arbitration hereunder) shall be submitted to arbitration...... 5

Nearly all grievance procedures limit arbitration to "disputes arising
under this contract" or define grievances as "disputes about the inter3 Matter of Wilkins, 169 N.Y. 494,62 N.E.575 (1902), quotedwith approval in MotorHaulage Co. v. Int'l Bro. Teamsters, Local 807, 272 App. Div. 383, 71 N.Y.S. 2d 352 (1947).
4 See In re General Dry Cleaners, 75 N.Y.S. 2d 615, 618 (1947), for a detailed list of grounds
for vacating awards by one participating in the arbitration proceedings.
s Art. VII B(2) of the agreement between Brooklyn Union Gas Co. and Local ioi, Utility
Division, Transport Workers Union of America, CI0, dated February 26, 1947. 5 C.C.H. Lab.
L. Rep. 53,120 (1950).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

pretation or application.., and about alleged violations of the Agreement."" Such restrictions limit the issues which may be decided by the
arbitrator with the result that arbitrability of the issue is the major
question of jurisdiction.
The clauses defining the arbitrable "issue are usually followed by a
provision to the effect that the arbitrator "shall have no power to add to
or subtract from or modify any of the terms of this Agreement." 7 This
places a second jurisdictional restriction on the arbitrator as to the
nature of the award to be made on an admittedly arbitrable issue. These
two problems of what the arbitrator has to decide and how he can decide it overlap considerably and often are inseparable. They will be
considered here however, as separable aspects of the jurisdictional
basis of review.
FINALITY OF

AWARD CONSTRUING JURISDICTIONAL

LIMITATIONS ON SUBJECT MATTER

Even though jurisdiction appears to be the first point of inquiry,
there exists the preliminary question of whether the court is free to
consider the issue of arbitrability. Often one of the parties objects to
the jurisdiction of the arbitrator in the arbitration proceedings and the
issue is passed upon by the arbitrator. May the arbitrator in this way
decide finally his own jurisdiction by means of a bootstrap doctrine?
This issue of arbitrability usually arises in situations in which the
parties are going to arbitration under the grievance procedure of a collective bargaining agreement whereby they have agreed to submit
future disputes to arbitration. It may also arise under an express submission of an existing dispute after proceedings have begun, but because the parties in this latter instance usually draft the submission to
cover completely the existing dispute, it normally does not.
Goldstein v. InternationalLadies Garment Workers' Unions is illustrative. There a member of an association discontinued its plant in
Philadelphia and continued to operate an existing plant at another city.
The union, which had an agreement with the association, charged that the
company had violated a clause prohibiting removal of a plant from
6Art. VI of the Agreement between Lever Brothers Co. and Local 336, United Gas, Coke,
and Chemical Workers of America, CIO, dated August 29, 1947. 5 C.C.H. Lab. L. Rep.
53,170 (I9O).
'Section 46 of the agreement between General Motors Corp. and UAW-CIO dated May 29,
1948. 5 C.C.H. Lab. L. Rep. 53,101 (z95o). Section 18(b) of the agreement between Ford
Motor Co. and UAW-CIO dated Sept. 29, 1947. 5 C.C.H. Lab. L. Rep. 53,16o (I95o).
8328 Pa. 385, i96 Atl. 43 (1938).

LABOR ARBITRATION AWARDS

Philadelphia, and went to arbitration under the contract's grievance
procedure. The company appeared before the arbitrator and denied his
jurisdiction on the grounds that the contract with the association did not
apply to it because it had a single company contract with the union
which it alleged superseded the association contract. The arbitrator in
his award found that (i) he had jurisdiction because the association
contract was binding on the company; (2) the company had moved its
plant in violation of the association contract. He ordered the company
to return to Philadelphia and employ its former employees. On proceedings for confirmation of the award, the lower court held that the contract question was a question of fact upon which the arbitrator's finding
was conclusive. The company appealed and the supreme court of Pennsylvania reversed, holding that the questions in this case relating to the
submission agreement were jurisdictional and not subject to final determination by the arbitrator. The court reasoned that as questions of
law, they were always subject to court review, and further, that due
process of law required such a review of the jurisdiction of the arbitrator.' It should be noted that the company objected to the submission
throughout the proceedings and did not waive any of its rights.
In a similar California case' ° the company argued before the permanent referee that a question of adding a maintenance of membership
clause to the collective bargaining agreement was not within the arbitration clause of that contract. The arbitration clause provided that the
arbitrator should not "have jurisdiction to arbitrate provisions of a new
agreement or to arbitrate away, in whole or in part, any provision of
9 The court referred to the issue of the arbitrator's jurisdiction and stated that the "appellants not only had a right under the statute but even a constitutional right to have that issue
determined by a judicial tribunal." Goldstein v. Int'l Ladies Garment Workers' Union, note
8 supra, at 392. The court approved the result of the leading case of Finsilver, Still & Moss,
Inc. v. Goldberg, Maas & Co., Inc., 253 N.Y. 382, 389 171 N.E. 579, 581 (r930), in which
Cardozo, C. J. stated: "Arbitration presupposes the existence of a contract to arbitrate. If a
party to a controversy denies the existence of the contract and with it the jurisdiction of the
irregular tribunal, the regular courts of justice must be open to him at some stage for the determination of the issue. The right to such a determination, either at the beginning or at the end
of the arbitration or in resistance to an attempted enforcement of the award, is assured by the
Constitution as part of its assurance of due process of law." The same holding appeared in
Schafran & Finkel, Inc. v. Lowenstein & Sons, Inc., 28o N.Y. z64, 19 N.E. 2d ioo5 (i939). If
such a judicial determination is not permitted, the result is compulsory arbitration without
even the aid of a statute which would seem to be invalid under Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v.
Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923), and Dorchy v. Kansas, 264U.S. 286 (I924).
See also Simpson, Constitutional Limitations on Compulsory Industrial Arbitration, 38 Harv.
L. Rev. 753 (1925); Braun, Settlement of Industrial Disputes 135 (i944).
10 Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp. v. United Automobile Workers, 16o P. 2d x13 (Calif.
App., 1945). A subsequent appeal of this case was dismissed as moot when the parties had replaced the old agreement with a new contract. 27 Cal. 2d 859, x67 P. 2d 725 (1946).
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this agreement." The arbitrator's award granted maintenance of membership, and the company raised the scope of submission issue on proceedings to confirm.
The court held that it could review the scope of submission under
the contract and found that the arbitrator had exceeded the scope of his
authority. The court stated: "It was the duty of the court to determine
from the agreement the extent of the referee's powers and to annul any
or all of the provisions of the award as to matters which had not been
submitted to him for decision."" The same view was stated by a federal district court when the position was taken that "[t]he terms of the
submission are the relevant portions of the contract, and those portions
jurisdiction,
are appropriate for construction by a court of competent
2
just as are all other provisions of the contract."'
Most contracts limit arbitration to "disputes arising under this contract," or contain similar provisions.'" Whenever a motion is made to
confirm or vacate an arbitrator's award under such a contract, the
court is called upon to enforce a contract to arbitrate certain limited
controversies. The court cannot avoid the duty of determining whether
the particular dispute is one which the parties agreed to arbitrate.' 4
Much of the language in the cases indicates that many courts feel
that the question of interpretation of the arbitration clause cannot be
submitted to the arbitrator. However, the basic premise of arbitration-consent to be bound by the award-places no limit on the issues
which may be submitted to the arbitration process. From this it seems
there is no reason why the parties to an arbitration agreement cannot
submit to the arbitrator all disputes concerning the meaning and scope
of the arbitration clause as well as the meaning of a seniority clause or
any other provision of the contract.' 5 Where such a submission has
-Ibid.,

at ii8.
O Workers Int'l Union v. Texoma Nat. Gas Co., 58 F. Supp. 132 (Tex., 1943), aff'd 146
Oil
F. 2d 62 (C.A. 5th, i945), cert. den. 324 U.S. 872 (i944). See also Solomon v. Forty-Second
Street Fotoshop, 72 N.Y.S. 2d 639 (I947).
'3

Note 6 supra.

Matter of Simons, 6 C.C.H. Lab. L. Rep. 65,402 (S.Ct. N.Y, 1949).
s This is not inconsistent with the following statement from Silva v. Mercier, 33 Cal. 2d
704, 709, 204 P. 2d 609, 613 (1949): "It has been held that the issue of whether a contract containing an arbitration clause exists, or is still in effect, is not within the purview of the arbitration clause for the reason that if there is no contract there is no provision for arbitration."
Compare General Electric Co. v. United Electrical Workers, CIO, 6 C.C.H. Lab. L. Rep.
65,546 (S. Ct. N.Y., 1949); Matter of Dumas, i6 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 64,944 (S. Ct. N.Y.,
'4

1949).
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been made, the arbitrator's interpretation of the scope of the submission should be no less final than his ruling on other questions or clauses.
Any contrary position overlooks the underlying theory of arbitration:
consent to be bound by the award.' 6 This question of arbitrability is
especially important in labor cases not only because the arbitration
clauses are often written in broad terms which seem to give the arbitrator final authority"7 but also because arbitrators in actual practice
are expected to-and do repeatedly-pass on the scope of their jurisdiction.'

8

The reasoning of the courts in the Goldstein and Consolidatedcases
is probably technically consistent with the proposition that, should the
parties so desire, they may submit the question of arbitrability, as any
other question of contract interpretation, to the arbitrator and be
bound by his decision. The problem of the existence of an agreement to
submit the question of arbitrability arose more clearly in Belding Heminway Co. v. Wholesale Workers' Union.' 9 In this case a member of an
association of warehouse owners operating in the "Uptown Area" of
New York City opened a new warehouse in New Jersey and curtailed
operations in New York. The union sought arbitration of a dispute
arising out of the employment of nonunion men at the new warehouse
and alleged that this violated the closed-shop provisions of the "Uptown Area" association contract which purported to cover any dispute,
grievance, or complaint "between the parties." The company refused to
arbitrate and sought a court order staying arbitration and directing a
trial on the issue of the existence of a contract to arbitrate this matter.
The supreme court denied the company's motion and the appellate division affirmed. ° The court of appeals reversed, and in a per curiam opinion stated: "Whether the appellant was bound to employ at its New
Jersey plant members of the respondent union was a debatable question
,6Belding Heminway Co. v. Wholesale Workers' Union, 295 N.Y. 541, 68 N.E. 2d 681
(1946); Matter of Publishers Assoc., 6 C.C.H. Lab. L. Rep. 65,471 (S. Ct. N.Y., 1949).
17 See General Motors Agreement, note 7 supra. The General Motors Contract apparently
contemplates the arbitrator's decision as to the arbitrability of any matter in the same section
which stated in part, "Any case appealed to the Umpire on which he has no power to rule shall
be referred back to the parties without decision."
,8 Armour & Co. and United Packinghouse Workers of America Arbitration No. 2-G (i947);
Bethlehem Steel Co. and United Steelworkers of America, 5 B.N.A. Lab. Arb. 684 (1946);
Ford Motor Co. and United Automobile Workers, Opinion A-iso (1944).
'9 295 N.Y. 541, 68 N.E. 2d 681 (1946).

20 270 App. Div. 879, 61 N.Y.S. 2d 302 (1946).
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which called for a decision as to the scope of the collective bargaining
agreement between the parties. This question, we think, was for the
'21
court, not for the arbitrators.
The problem of a decision on arbitrability by the arbitrator also
arose in Rogers Diesel and Aircraft Corp. v. Local 1259.22 There the
grievance procedure covered "any dispute about working conditions"
and any "dispute about the interpretation and application of particular
clauses of this agreement and about alleged violations of the agreement .... ." The company disciplined employees for alleged violation of
company rules and the union moved for arbitration. The company
sought a court order staying arbitration. The court refused, ruling that
the dispute "whether or not the particular issue of suspension is arbitrable involves an interpretation and application of particular clauses,
which latter question is arbitrable."
Many union contracts in effect today have very broad provisions for
grievance adjustments terminating in arbitration. These clauses form
an integrated part of the contract and, in the view of many, the most
important part. The inclusion of grievance procedure clauses covering
"any dispute, claim, question or difference arising out of or relating to
this agreement" would appear to disclose an intent to forego court
action regarding all problems concerning that agreement. 3 At least the
courts should consider the parties' intention as it is reflected in such
broad clauses. Heretofore the emphasis has been on the merits of the
dispute: that is, whether the acts complained of came within the scope
of the agreement. To force a company or a union to abide by an award
when it has not consented to arbitration would appear to be a violation
2'295 N.Y. 54f, 68 N.E. 2d 68i (1946). Application of Graphite Metallizing Corp., 271
App. Div. 839,66 N.Y.S. 2d 53 (1946), was a proceeding to stay arbitration of a dispute concerning a person leaving the company's employ six months before the collective bargaining
agreement became effective. The court followed the Belding Ileminway case and stated, "The
question of law thus presented as to the scope of the collective bargaining agreement was for
the court, and not for the arbitrator to decide." See also Matter of Publishers Assoc., 6 C.C.H.
Lab. L. Rep. 65,471 (S. Ct. N.Y., 1949).

i5 L.R.R.M. 848 (S. Ct. N.Y., 1945).
23 This

was the clause in the contract between the employer and the union in Oppenheim,
Collins & Co. v. Display Union, 73 N.Y.S. 2d 673, 674 (1947), where the contract also vested
the employer with "sole discretion" as to the necessity of dismissals due to business exigencies
and the court held the matter was not arbitrable and could not be submitted to arbitration.
This holding would seem to preclude on a basis of scope of submission, any determination that
the dismissals were or were not caused by business exigencies. At the same time the court also
held the propriety of employment of nonunion members under a closed shop contract was
arbitrable. Compare Stein v. Local 68o of Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees, 41 N.J. Eq. 226,
56 A. 2d 715 (1948),where the court considered the arbitrator to have no right to determine the
question of rescission of the union contract.
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of due process and clearly undesirable. However, there appears no reason why the parties may not submit the issue of arbitrability to arbitration. The question for the court on the scope of submission should
therefore include an inquiry to determine whether the parties have by
any act agreed to be bound by the arbitrator's decision on the question
of arbitrability.
FINALITY OF AwARD CONSTRUING LImiTATIONS ON NATURE OF AWARD

The clauses defining the disputes subject to arbitration usually include or are followed by a provision that the arbitrator shall make no
ruling in "conflict with the provisions of the agreement" nor "add to or
modify" the agreement.24 This type of clause suggests a problem distinct from, although similar to that of the finality of an award on arbitrability. Does such a restriction impose a limitation on the arbitrator's
power which the parties intend the courts to interpret and enforce?
Or does it lay down a rule of construction for the arbitrator to follow
and as to which he has the final word? The General Motors clause indicates that the parties contemplated a decision by the umpire on this
question. 5 Such a decision apparently would be valid. When the contract provides that "all disputes" are subject to arbitration but that the
award should not "conflict" with the terms of the agreement, it would
seem that this same result could well be contemplated by the parties.
Such a clause was found in Screen Cartoonists Guild Local 852 v. Disney"s in which the court held the arbitrator had exceeded his authority
even though he appeared to have made a good faith attempt, supported
by evidence, to interpret the provisions of the contract consistently with
the intent of the parties.
That this is a genuine problem is shown by Western Union v. Communications Assn.17 In that case the contract contained the following
submission provision in the grievance procedure:
In the event that an agreement cannot be reached between the Union and the
Company with respect to the application or interpretation of this contract ... it is

agreed that such matters will be submitted ... to Max Meyer, as impartial arbitrator.... The arbitrator shall not have authority to alter or modify any of the
express provisions of the contract....
24See note 7 supra.
2sNote 7 supra.

2676 Cal. App. 2d 414, 168 P. 2d 983 (1946).
2 299 N.Y. 177, 86 N.E. 2d 162 (1949).

624
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The arbitrator interpreted the "no strikes or other stoppages of
work" clause to permit employees to refuse to handle "hot traffic" messages from struck companies by reading into the clause the practice and
custom prevalent in the telegraph industry. The New York court of
appeals vacated the award because:
By that conclusion, as we view it, the arbitrator-entering a field of decision from
which the parties had expressly excluded him-modified an express provision of the
contract by which the union had agreed that "there shall be ...no stoppages of work
during the life of this contract." As the language employed leaves no doubt as to its
meaning "there is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation." 28

The dissenting judges considered it "a pure question of interpretation and application, and the very kind of question which the parties
themselves had agreed should be decided by the arbitrator alone."
Whether or not this is a jurisdictional matter is debatable. Such a
clause should be given a rather limited scope in order to be construed
consistently with one submitting "any" or "all" disputes to arbitration.
Having in mind the usual desire of parties to labor disputes to stay out
of the courts, the courts should weigh the possible intention to consider
this as a rule of construction for the arbitrator. Under the clauses in
the General Motors, Disney and Western Union contracts it seems a
reasonable interpretation of the submission that the parties anticipated
a binding award on this point. This is within the principle that the
parties may submit questions of arbitrability if they so desire.
JURISDICTIONAL REVIEW OF THE MERITS

The preceding discussion presumes the court has the right if not the
duty to review the scope of submission or jurisdiction of the arbitrator.
When the arbitrator proceeds beyond the issue of the submission, the
parties are not only improperly bound without their consent, but the
arbitrator has no reasonable basis upon which to make a just award.29
28Ibid., at 184 and i66. The court also gave the additional grounds that the contract as
interpreted permitted violation of a penal statute regulating the service of public utilities. It
seems apparent however, that the court reviewed the award as it would a lower court decision
when it stated: "We know of no case where a court, in construing... language as clear as is
the clause here in controversy, has found it necessary to employ extrinsic means to ascertain
a party's obligation thereunder." Ibid., at 185 and 166. This discussion perhaps raises the broad
question of whether evidentiary matters come within the scope of arbitration issue. It is believed that an exploration of that issue would unduly extend this article. Therefore, the question of whether an arbitrator is limited to the evidence submitted by the parties, or may rely
upon such extrinsic matters as his independent knowledge of the circumstance, custom and
usage within the industry, or decisions of other arbitrators, is not included within the scope
of this paper. It is believed that this is more appropriately treated as a hearing or post-hearing
matter.
29See Publishers Ass'n v. N.Y. Typo. Union, 168 N.Y. Misc. 267, 5 N.Y.S. 2d 847 (1938).
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The interest of the parties and of justice therefore require that the court
act in such cases. Under any restrictive submission clause, however,
the courts are in danger of intruding themselves into the merits under
the guise of determining whether the arbitrator has jurisdiction. With
the growing acceptance of the restrictive clauses noted above, this is an
increasing danger. In such situations, the reviewing court occasionally
appears to go beyond the actual problems of submission by means of a
purported review of the arbitrator's jurisdiction. In the Disney case, 0
the company and the union included a clause in their contract stating
that the regular hours of work would be "[e]ight hours per day, forty
hours per week, five days per week, Monday through Friday inclusive."
The contract also included premium pay clauses required by Executive
Order 9240 providing premium pay for the sixth and seventh days of a
work week. The contract further provided for paid holidays when they
fell within the work week. Two holidays fell on Saturday and the company refused to pay therefor and the parties went to arbitration under
a clause covering "all complaints" but with a provision binding the arbitrator to the terms of the contract." The arbitrator noted that the term
"work week" was used only in the holiday clause and the Executive
Order 9240 clause. Executive Order 924o had been interpreted to mean

a work week of seven consecutive days. The same definition had been
adopted under the Fair Labor Standards Act and was generally accepted by industry. In line with this, the arbitrator concluded that "the
form of clause Fifth [Executive Order 92401 indicates a concept of the
work-week as seven days, some of which are straight-time days and
others overtime days.... Since the term 'work-week' clearly means
seven days where it is used earlier in the contract, it is reasonable to
interpret it as meaning the same thing in clause Eleventh [holiday
clause]." On proceedings to confirm, the trial court granted the company's motion to vacate and on appeal the trial court was affirmed.
The court of appeals of California found there was "no doubt that
30Screen Cartoonists GuildLocal 852 v. Disney, 74 Cal. App. 2d 414, 168 P. 2d 983 (1946).
3' The pertinent parts of the grievance procedure provided: "4. All complaints, grievances,
controversies, disputes, questions of interpretation of this agreement and all other differences
between the parties hereto, shall be heard and determined by the Impartial Chairman (arbiter), if the same cannot in the first instance be otherwise disposed of under provisions hereof
between the parties hereto. Said Impartial Chairman shall have power to make and enter any
order, ruling or decree which in its judgment appears to be just and reasonable, having due
regard for justice and equity in each case; such rulingor decree, however, shall not be in conflict
with the express provisionsof this agreement. 5.... Each case brought to the Impartial Chairman shall be considered on its own merits, and this agreementshallconstitutethe basis upon which
such decision shall be rendered." (Italics added.)
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clause fifth... fixed a regularly scheduled work week of five days....
Otherwise, if a work week of seven days had been contemplated, all
holidays would fall within such work week, and clause eleventh would
cease to have any meaning." After thus effectively reviewing the merits,
the court concluded:
From the foregoing, it appears that in construing the work week to include Saturday, the arbiter's ruling was in direct conflict with the express terms of the bargaining contract, and thus exceeded the powers conferred upon him under clause
32
thirteenth, heretofore quoted.

The company and the union in I.A.M. v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc.s
agreed to meet "early in July 1946 to discuss payment of a bonus for
the-first six months of 1946." In July 1946, the parties met and the
company agreed to discuss, but not to pay, the bonus. The union urged
that payment had been agreed upon and the discussion referred to in
the contract was to concern the amount to be paid. On disagreement the
union moved to compel arbitration under the grievance procedure providing for arbitration of disputes as to the "meaning, performance, nonperformance or application" of the contract provisions. The company
moved to stay arbitration. The trial court ordered arbitration and on
appeal the appellate division reversed and stated in its per curiam
opinion:
The clause of the agreement that "the Company agrees to meet with the Union
early in July 1946 to discuss payment of a bonus for the first six months of 1946"
can only mean what it says, that the parties will discuss the subject. While the
contract provides for abitration of disputes as to the "meaning, performance, nonperformance or application" of its provisions, the mere assertion by a party of a
meaning of a provision which is clearly contrary to the plain meaning of the words
cannot make an arbitrable issue. It is for the Court to determine whether the contract contains a provision for arbitration of the dispute tendered, and in the exercise of that jurisdiction the Court must determine whether there is such a dispute.
If the meaning of the provision of the contract sought to be arbitrated is beyond
dispute, there cannot be anything to arbitrate and the contract cannot be said to
proide for arbitration.3 4
On appeal the Court of Appeals of New York affirmed without
opinion. Judge Fuld, dissenting, stated:
I have difficulty in concluding, as respondent urges, that reasonable men cannot
differ as to the meaning of the provision in question. While I see that as a possible
construction, I do not consider it the only one. It may well be argued, and in good
faith, that in the light of surrounding circumstances and of experience in the in3'2
Note 26
3'

supra.

271 App. Div. 917, 67 N.Y. S. 2d ,37,aff'd 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E. 2d 464
at 9x8 and 318.

34 Ibid.,

(1947).
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dustry and, indeed, in this very business, respondent company agreed that a bonus
would be paid-at least where the company's business warranted-and that it would
discuss with the employees the amount of payment, i.e., "payment of a bonus."
If there is a possibility of such a construction, the court should not remove the
controversy from the sphere of arbitration, particularly when the applicable arbitration clause--"If any dispute shall arise . . . as to meaning, performance, nonperformance or application of the provisions of this agreement--is so broad.3 5

Both the Disney case and the Cutler-Hammer case appear to be instances in which the court effectively reviewed the merits of the findings
of the arbitrator under the guise of a review as to the scope of the very
broad submission clauses. One of the chief advantages of arbitration is
to secure the adjudication of disputes by persons trained in the field and
familiar with the manner in which the industry operates. To permit review of the merits by a court in such cases is to lose this advantage.
However, assuming that on the merits the union's contentions in both
cases were wrong, still the parties had agreed to arbitration under broad
clauses and had in effect agreed to be bound by the decision resulting
from arbitration. The value of a court review of the merits even if the
award is concededly wrong is seriously questioned. The cases seem to
illustrate the undesirable manner in which the courts, by interjecting
themselves into the arbitration of labor disputes, may depress the faith
of the parties in arbitration. It is upon this faith that the bulk of good
labor relations depends.
The danger that the courts will review the merits on jurisdictional
grounds constantly recurs because jurisdictional grounds are advanced
in nearly every case as a basis for review of an award which is unsatisfactory to one of the parties. Then too, in many cases it is difficult to
draw the line between the scope of submission review that is a necessary protection for the parties and the less desirable practice of using
it as a means of reviewing the merits of the controversy. It is submitted,
however, that the courts can aid all parties to labor disputes by giving
full effect to the submission agreement contemplated by the parties and
by avoiding a review of the merits of the award.
TimE LIMITATIONS
The prior cases discussed involved the question of whether the factual basis of the case came within the submission clause. The scope of
submission question comes up in a somewhat different form in the time
limitation cases. The time limitation appears in two situations: one,
3S297

N.Y. 5rg, 74 N.E.
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(1947).
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when arbitrators are to make their award within a specific period of
time; the other, when the various steps in the grievance procedure are
subject to specified periods of limitation. The first is' a part of the traditional arbitration proceeding while the second is becoming a more
important feature of the four- or five-step grievance procedure common
to present day collective bargaining agreements. In Hegeberg v. New
England Fish Co., the first type of problem arose in familiar circumstances. 8 The union and the canners were negotiating prices just before the opening of the salmon season. Unable to agree and pressed by
the coming salmon run, the parties agreed on minimum prices and
agreed to arbitrate the difference with a provision that the award was
to be filed with the Federal Conciliator by August 25, 1938. Meanwhile

work went on for the whole season. The board of arbitration set
the wage and price scales for some one hundred canneries on the Alaskan coast. They reached unanimous agreement on this multitude of
rates on August 24, informed the conciliator orally on August 25, and
filed a formal written award on August 26. In an action by the em-

ployees for wages based on the award, the companies urged that the
filing of the award did not comply with the requirements of submission.
The supreme court of Washington, however, enforced the award. 7
The same problem of an award after expiration of a time limit in the
submission arose in a case in which a controversy regarding modification of a contract between a union and a railroad was submitted to a
board of arbitrators under the Railway Labor Act.3 8 The stipulation
provided for the filing of the award within fifteen days from the beginning of hearings. Immediately after the hearing an informal vote was
taken at which the union appointee and the Federal Mediation Board
appointee voted for a clause paying overtime after eight hours of work
per day. The public member wrote up a draft award and included a
367 Wash. 2d 5o9, 110 P. 2d X82 (1941).

37 Replying to the defendant's contention, the court said, "A sound and well recognized
public policy strongly supports arbitration of disputes between employers and employees. Apparently all parties relied upon the anticipated appraisement in entire good faith.... The
trifling delay in the filing of the award could make no possible difference to anyone. The essence of the matter was to settle what was an apparently bitter dispute between employers
and employees, and to enable the fishing to proceed, thereby avoiding great loss to all parties
concerned.... We are convinced ... that it should not be held that the slight delay in filing
the award should render the award void." 7 Wash. 2d 5o9, 512 et seq., 1io P. 2d 182, 187 et
seq. (X941).
. 38 Brotherhood of Ry. and S.S. Clerks v. Norfolk So. Ry. Co.,
143 F. 2d ioi5 (C.A. 4 th,
1944).
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clause to the effect that if the award forced a curtailment of service to
the public, it should be abrogated by mutual agreement. The labor
member refused to sign it and the resulting difference caused such a
delay that the award was not made or filed until ninety days after the
beginning of the hearing. Meanwhile, fifty-five days after beginning of
the hearings, the company had filed a suit to impeach and vacate any
award that might be made. The district court impeached the award and
the union appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed. The court pointed out that the Railway Labor Act required
"prompt and orderly settlement" of disputes and that the parties themselves set a time limit. The Railway Labor Act permits impeachment of
an award to be had for lack of substantial conformity to the Act or submission but not "for trivial irregularity or clerical error, going only to
form and not to substance. ' 39 Time was of the essence in arbitration at
common law and the statute had made no change in that regard. Further the deviation from the submission was substantial so that the
board was without authority and no award could properly be made.40
Both of these cases recognize a principle favorable to arbitration and
consistent with the scheme of arbitration free from unnecessary formality and technicality. The slight delay occasionally incident to the filing
of an award should not be permitted to destroy its effect. On the other
hand, the need for speed and compliance with the reasonable limitations
of the submission require prudent review of substantial delays and
breaches of the submission agreement. A prejudicial delay should not
be tolerated and yet an insignificant one should not destroy the time
and effort invested in the settlement of a dispute.
The second type of time restriction problem arises in many present
day collective bargaining agreements which provide for a time limitation period at each step of the grievance procedure. By this device, the
last answer of the party against whom the grievance or complaint is
made, normally the company, becomes the final disposition of the matter if it is not carried to the next step of the grievance procedure within
a stated number of days. At the lower levels of management this period
is usually rather short, lengthening as the matter is considered by top
management and union officials with usually the longest period just
3945 Stat. 585 (X926), 45 U.S.C.A. 159 (1943)40 Compare Pratt, Read & Co. v. United Furniture Workers, 7o A. 2d 120 (Conn., 1949).
On this problem generally see Annotation, i54 A.L.R. 1392 (I944).
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before arbitration. In Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Pope,4 the court
held that such a contract limitation was effective to bar further action
after a failure to appeal an adverse decision on a complaint. An award
made thereafter on the same claim was invalid. This decision seems
proper and offers considerable protection against stale claims. After
submission the parties have made earnest effort to settle the dispute and
have expended considerable time and expense to protect this investment; some leniency in regard to limitation clauses should therefore be
tolerated. However, many of these factors are not present in the steps
of the grievance procedure below arbitration. The procedure there is
part and parcel of the bargaining process between the employer and his
employees or their representatives. It is a recognized benefit in these
relations that complaints and grievances be settled quickly and not left
to smolder and cause discontent. Time limitations in the pre-arbitration
stage promote healthy labor relations by providing speedy disposition
of grievances, and adherence to them-should be encouraged, more so
than after the matter has left the hands of the principals and has gone
into the hands of the third-party arbiter.
Even though a time limitation in the grievance procedure seems beneficial to prevent stale claims, there remains the question whether this"
limitation should be considered jurisdictional or simply a rule of limitation to be applied by the arbitrator. In the instance of whether Sundays
or holidays are counted as part of the limitation period, rather difficult
complications would result if the award was vacated because the arbitrator and the court differed as to whether such a day should be
counted. Further, since this is a matter of agreement between the
parties, this limitation may be waived. Being subject to waiver, it does
not seem jurisdictional in the normal sense of that term. Still it appears
to go to arbitrability and should be considered along with other arbi4r x19 F. 2d 39 (C. A. 4 th, 1941). An interesting problem incident to this holding is one
which was of greater importance prior to the Portal to Portal Act of 1947, 6i Stat. 84 (1947),
29 U.S. C.A. § 251 (Supp. 1949). The federal courts had taken the position that an agreement
to arbitrate "any difficulty or disagreement ...in any way growing out of the relation of employers and employee" precluded an action at law for overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Donahue v. Susquehanna Colliers Co., 138 F. 2d 3 (C.A. 3 d, 1943); Watkins v. Hudson Coal Co., 54 F. Supp. 953 (Pa., 1944), aff'd 1i F. 2d 311, cert. den. 327 U.S. 777 (r946);
Evans v. Hudson Coal Co. 165 F. 2d 970 (1948). See also Van Vloten v. News Syndicate Co.,
17 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 65,520 (D.C. N.Y., ig5o). Thus the problem of limitation could, it
seems, have been determined by such arbitration clauses. It has been suggested that a similar
device could be used by unions to preclude harassing suits under Sections 3o and 303 of the
Labor Management Relations Act. Gray, Nature and Scope of Arbitration and Arbitration
Clauses, New York Univ. First Annual Conference on Labor x97, 218 (1948). See also Torff,
Taft-Hartley Act and Collective Bargaining: A Management Appraisal, 43 111. L. Rev. 323,

343 (1948).
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trability questions. Under the normal four-step grievance procedure it
seems reasonable to conclude that the parties have in this instance submitted the question of arbitrability to the final decision of the arbitrator. His decision should stand unless the arbitrator avowedly extends
the limitation period.
PARTIAL OR FRACTIONAL AWARD

Under the jurisdictional concept in arbitration, the arbitrator must
abide strictly by the provisions of the submission agreement. His award
must be responsive to the full scope of that agreement. Because of this,
an arbitrator not only is restricted from deciding more than is submitted
to him but he is also traditionally enjoined from deciding less than is
submitted to him. The principle is that "it is a fundamental requisite of
an award that it shall be co-extensive with the submission" and must
"embrace all the matters referred to him for decision with a positive
adjudication upon each."142 If there was no consent to a partial or fractional award, an award on one of two issues is invalid and may be
vacated because the arbitrator failed to pass on all matters submitted.4
While the proposition is often stated as above, an investigation of the
cases reveals that the courts do permit partial awards when the issues
and therefore the portions of the award are not interdependent, and the
portion of the award sustained may stand alone. An example of this is
Moyer v. Van-Dye-Way Corporation" in which the parties submitted
disputes regarding three sums allegedly due the employees and the
union. The arbitrator found the employees and union were entitled to
two of the sums and so awarded. However, on the evidence available he
did not feel competent to make an award on the third sum and directed
an accounting be had, the company to pay over whatever appeared due
on the accounting. The company failed to comply and the union sued in
the federal district court for judgment on the award and the amount of
the third fund. The district court upheld the award as to the first sum
but denied recovery for the second and third sums. The only appeal was
by the defendant from judgment for the first sum. The Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit affirmed, and speaking through Judge Goodrich,
stated:
42Application of Mac!ahon, 63 N.Y. S. 2d 657 (1946).
43 Associated Corset and Brassiere Mfrs. v. Corset and Brassiere Workers, 172 N.Y. Misc.
io29, z6 N. Y. S. 2d 736 (1939). The use of the term "fractional award" may be preferable in

view of the possible connotation of prejudice in "partial." However, the term "partial award"
appears to have some general acceptance.
44 126 F. 2d 339 (C.A. 3d, X942).
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It is established, we believe, that an award may be rejected in part and sustained
in part .... It may also be taken as established that if the arbitrator has failed to
execute his entire commission and that which he has done does not stand alone but
depends in part upon the part unsettled, the award as a whole must fall .... On the
other hand however, judicial utterance in New York supports the view that when
the matters omitted are not necessarily dependent on and connected with the other
points a partial award will be sustained .... The same is true where an award sued
on is uncertain in its disposition of part of the case submitted .... This point of view
expresses what is stated to be the now generally prevailing rule of law. 45

The Boott Mills case is an example of refusing to sustain a partial
award where the questions were interdependent.4 6 The parties submitted the two questions of a fair wage and fair work load for loom fixers
to arbitration. The board of arbitration decided the wage rate without
deciding the work load. The company sought to quash the arbitration
proceedings including the award. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts held the award invalid because of failure to decide both
questions submitted when it was "manifest that there questions were
interdependent." On this point the court stated:
In so doing the board, acting as arbitrators, did not pursue its commission as to
one of the questions submitted for arbitration which had a direct bearing upon the
proper determination of the other question as to which an award was made. "That
an award which fails to decide all the material questions submitted is invalid, is a
principle well established." 47

The results in other cases have followed the same pattern. Where
the questions are in fact interdependent, a partial award will not be
sustained. 8 Conversely where the issues are not in fact interdependent,
a partial award will be enforced.4 9 Hence, the validity of a partial award
appears to turn upon the test of separability.
4S Ibid., at 341. The case is also interesting because it involved a New Jersey corporation, a
union representing Pennsylvania employees and an award made in New York. The court held
the Pennsylvania conflicts of laws rule referred to the law of New York where the award was
made and that the award was good under New York law even though the arbitrator did not
decide all issues submitted because the partial award was not dependent on matters not decided.
46 Boott Mills v. Board of Conciliation and Arbitration, 311 Mass. 223, 40 N.E. 2d 870

(1942).

47Ibid., at 226

and 871.
of MacMahon, 63 N.Y. S. 2d 657 (1946).
49In re E. A. Laboratories, Inc., 5o N.Y.S. 2d 222 (1944). See also Publishers Ass'n v.N.Y.
Typo. Union, 168 N.Y. Misc. 267, 5N.Y. S. 2d 847 (1938); Marchant v. Mead Morrison Mfg.
Co., 252 N.Y. 284, 169 N.E. 386 (1929); In re Herman, 17o N.Y. Misc. 852, 10 N.Y. S. 2d 46
48 Application

(1938).

LABOR ARBITRATION AWARDS

633

CONCLUSION

Judicial review of labor arbitration awards on jurisdictional grounds
is necessary and proper. However, it seems necessary strictly to limit
this review to the determination of the scope of the submission agreement. If the parties have submitted the questions of arbitrability to the
arbitrator, such a submission should be as effective as any other submission. If this procedural protection is given, the award should be
final and conclusive on all parties. There should be no retrial of the
merits by the court under the guise of a jurisdictional review. To do so
will destroy the value of a procedure that has given industry, labor, and
the public a service that the courts have not given and probably are not
equipped to give.

